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Derivative Actions as a Mechanism for Protection of. 
Minority Shareholders in China: Theory, La·w and 
Practice 
Jane Fu* 
Deakin University, Australia 
Abstract. The protection ofminority shareholders has become one 
of the key features of corporate governance in many countries in recent 
years. The statutmy derivative action has been created as one of the major 
mechanisms to achieve this objective. China also adopted a similar 
mechanism - officially known as the "shareholder representative action" 
(also called the derivative action) in 2005; this mechanism was largely 
based upon China's understanding of statutory derivative actions in major 
Western countries. This article examines the shareholder representative 
action mechanism in China for the protection of minority shareholders 
from the perspectives of the theoretical debates, the legal scheme, and the 
practical effect. It focuses on an analysis of the confusion of theoretical 
debates about the nature of the shareholder derivative action and the 
procedural obstacles for its utilisation in China. It concludes that the 
shareholder representative action in China is a mechanism which rests 
upon a half-understanding of Western derivative actions; the incomplete 
law-making and the weak court system has diminished the functions of 
derivative actions in China. 
1. Introduction 
,· 
China's laws on the protection of minority shareholders are mainly found in two piece's"' 
of legislation, 1 namely, the Company Law and the Securities Law. These two Laws . 
were first enacted by China's highest lawmaking body- the Standing Cmmnittee ofthe 
National People's Congress (NPCi in 1993 and 1998 respectively. Constant criticisms 
of them had been made since their enactments. One of the criticisms was that they 
lacked effective mechanisms for the protection of shareholders3 and that led to the mass: 
abuse of powers by directors and majority shareholders.4 
- " LLB (Peking), LLM (Canbena), PhD in Law (UNSW), Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Dea~n 
University, Australia, jane.fu@deakin.edu.au. An earlier version of this atticle was presented at Peking 
University Law School conference entitled Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility ' 
in2006. 
1 Legislation in China only refers to the law making of the National People's Congress or its Standing 
Committee- the equivalent as Western countries' national parliaments. 
2 Hereinafter ''NPC". 
3 Liang, DB, 'Amending the Company Law fi:om the Perspective of Securities Regulation' in Guo, F 
and J Wang (eds) On Amending the Company Law, Beijing, Law Press, 2000, pp 29-34 at 32; Xu,~) 
'The Company Law Should Be Improved to Protect Minority Shareholders' in Guo, F and I Wang (e h 
On Amending the Company Lavv, Beijing, Law Press, 2000, pp 134-140 at 136; Chen, XL, 'On 1 e 
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In response to the criticisms, 5 the 1993 Company Law and the 1998 Securities Law 
were both substantially amended at the Eifhteenth Meeting of the Tenth Standing 
Committee of the NPC on 27 October 2005. Both Laws came into effect on 1 January 
2006. One of the key areas of amendments was the introduction of vru.ious mechanisms 
which sought to enhance the protection of shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders. The shareholder representative action is one of these mechanisms. It is 
provided in article 152 ofthe Company Law of2005. 
The shareholder representative action is commonly referred to as the derivative 
action by Chinese legal scholars. This action is intended to have a significant impact on 
the improvement of corporate governance in Chinese companies a~d the development 
of China's socialist market economy. · 
However, by analysing the concept of the shareholder representative action and the 
problems involved with the proceedings for b1inging such actions in Chinese courts, this 
article argues that although the shareholder representative action mechanism in China 
has been strongly influenced by Western models, it was built upon a half-understanding 
of Westem derivative actions. The company law reforms up till the end of 2005 
reflected an uneasy compromise between the dire need for the protection of 
shareholders and the ambiguities that arose in legal proceedings because of China's 
weak comt system. This article concludes that the mechanism of the shareholder 
representative action is not viable in its current form and actually causes great cm~fusion 
and inconsistence. This mechanism is largely symbolic; due to the specific 
characteristics of the Chinese legal system, this mechanism is merely a tentative gesture 
v.~th few real functions . 
This article is structured as follows: Part II reviews the background to the making of 
China's 2005 Company Law and Securities Law with the focus on the introduction of 
the shareholder representative action. Part III compares the provisions on the protection 
ofminority shareholders in the 1993 Company Law and the 1998 Securities Law with 
those found in the 2005 Company Law and Securities Law. Pru.t IV offers some 
conclusions and suggestions. 
2. Background 
When the flrst PRC Company Law was enacted on 29 December 1993, the aim of this 
law was to 'meet the need of a socialist market economy and establish a modem 
euterp1ise system by adopting a shareholding system in state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). '7 The provisions of the 1993 Company Law were focused on transforming 
SOEs into either limited liability companies or shareholding limited liability companies. 
The securities mru.·kets were established as an experiment in the early 1990s and the first 
Securities Law was not enacted until December 1998. With the rapid development of 
Corporate Govemance Structure in Joint Stock Limited Liability Companies' in Guo, F and J Wang 
~eds) On Amending the Company Law, Beijing, Law Press, 2000, pp 190-203 at 194. 
Gan, Peizhong, 'The Effective Application of Derivative Actions in China', 
~ttp:/~www.cel.cnfshow.asp?c_id'=365&c_upid=l20&c_grade'=3&a_id'=l997, visited 18 August 2012 
Durmg the Second Plenary Meeting of the NPC in March 2004, there were 602 deputies of the NPC 
' m~d_e a.proposal to a substantial revision of the 1993 Company Law. The State Council and its 
~stries, local govemments, enterprises and professionals and experts all suggested amendments to 
~ e Company Law. See, Cao, KT, "Explanations on the Amendments to the PRC Company Law" in J 
_6 n ~ed) An Annotation of the New PRC Company Law, Law Press, 2005, p 350 . 
• 1 lbHI, p 356. 
'' An, J (ed),Annotation of the PRC Company Law, Beijing, Law Press, 2005, p 1. 
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the socialist market economy it soon became apparent that the old Company Law ·. 
Securities Law would not suit the development of China's economy. 8 One of tb~ ­
problems with the 1993 Company Law was that 'it did not have effective m '' 
for the protection of shareholders, especially minority shareholders'9 and it al~~ 
' ... effective tools to protect creditors, other stakeholders and public interests• : 
long time the Chinese securities market had often been described as being wo:se 
'casino' 11, and it was said that investing in such market was like 'dan-6ing 'i 
wolves'. L Thus the aims of the 2005 amendments to both Company Law ' .· · ·. 
Law were to 'adjust relevant systems, maintain the market economic order · 
transaction risks so as to make the Company Law more suitable for the ecob 
social development, and provide legal protection for the overall develop~~nt 
economy and society'. 13 .l$ 
During the drafting process, the drafters conducted studies of foreign ., 
by visiting foreign countries and convening symposia in China on foreigli .rnrn.,..,,_, 
laws with the participation of foreign company law experts. 14 The major fon!i~ 
that China studied were those ofthe USA, Germany, Japan, Korea and Hong" ~v ... ~=; .• ·"''·t 
Several drafts of the Company Law Amendment Bill were prep 
version of the Bill drafted by the State Council was sent to the Standing ~V"U.U.LlHl(;G. 
the National People's Congress for the first reading in December 2004. The 
third, and final versions of the Company Amendment Bill were wd~en by . 
Legislative Affairs Conunission (LAC) ofthe Standing Committee ofthe NPC 
the bill of the State Council. 16 The LAC acknowledged that its bill was stili''· 
and that some of its aspects remained unchanged either due to a lack of 
consensus. 17 Nevertheless, the 2005 Company Law contains thorough 
the old law with most of the old articles being rewritten. " 
Before the 1993 Company Law was enacted, the drafting of the Securirl'es 
already started. In August 1992, the Fiscal and Finance Conunittee of the :NPt · 
Securities Law Drafting Group. 18 A draft bill was prepared in August 1~·9,3 
study of foreign securities market regulations and practices, as well as the:study 
experiences of the Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges. 'iJhe ... 
the draft Securities Law bill included: 'the improvement of the development · 
socialist market economy; ensuring openness, justice, fairness, efficiency; and 
the securities market; and the protection of the interests of investors.' 19 '::' 
8 Cao, KT, 'Explanations on the Amendments to the PRC Company Law' in JAn (ed}''An 
of the PRC New Company Law, Beijing, Law Press, 2005, p 349. :;; ,. 
9
llid ' 
ro Ibid. _:.r; 
11 In 2001, Professor Wu Jinglian, one of the most influential economists in the C11inese 
reform alleged that China's securities market was even worse than a casino as 'a ca.s~ilo at 
rules for games'. See Wu Jinglian, Ten Years of the Securities Market (Shinian FenKJ11! Hua 
Beijing, Economic RefmmPress, 2003, pp 1-32. ,~'f 
12 See Jiangyu Wang, 'Dancing with Wolves: Regulation and Deregulation of Forei~.~ 
China's Stock Market' (2004) 5 Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal at LexisNex.is g~sf 
November 2006). <: 
13 Above note 5, p 351. 
14 Ibid, p 350. : { 
~~ ~-
16 Ibid, p 4. . ''I; ~-
17 Ib 'd, 5 ~;j .· 
1 p . '''"' 18 Liu, SQ, 'Explanations of the Securities Law Bill' in the Securities Law Drafting 9E91,ip 
of the PRC Securities LCllv, Beijing, Reform Press, 1999, p 342. 
19 Ibid 
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However, due to the short history of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
and a lack of experience from practice, China's cautious legislators postponed the 
drafting.20 The S~curities Law was not enacted until 29 December 1998. This is a ve1y 
narrow and simple piece of legislation; its principal focus is upon the regulation and 
supervision of the securities market. 
After some 15 years of securities market practice and studying, the legislators had 
finally released the serious inadequacies in the 1998 Securities Law. They also realised 
the importance for the introduction of mechanisms for the protection of minority 
shareholders as this market is predominated by vulnerable retail investors?' New 
provisions on the shareholder representative action were introduced in both Company 
Law and Securities Law of 2005. 
The following Part reviews these new provisions. Rationales for the shareholder 
representative action will be examined. The procedures for such actions will also be 
investigated. 
3. Protection of Minority Shareholders and the Sha:reho~ders 
Representative Action in the Chinese Law 
3.1 Schemes for the Protection of Minority Shareholders 
It is clear from analysed above that the 1993 Company Law did not focus on the 
protection of minority shareholders, although this matter was declared as one of its 
purposes. 22 The 2005 Company Law, however, has strengthened the protection of 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders. It has imposed new duties on directors, 
supervisors and other senior officers of the company. These provisions have indirectly 
provided a possibility for the protection of minority shareholders. The new Company 
Law has also added mt icles with respect to the direct protection of shareholders. First, 
shareholders are now given the right to know about the company's business. This right 
is seen as the foundation for the protection of minority shareholders. This type of right 
includes the right to inspect and make a copy of the company's articles of association, 
the resolutions of the meetings of the board of directors, the resolutions of the meetings 
of the supervisory board, as well as the financial accounting reports of the company/3 
joint stock companies have a duty to prepare and provide relevant information and 
documents at designated places, 24 and must provide shareholders with periodic reports 
of the remuneration paid to directors, supervisors and senior managerial officers of the 
,. 
company.-) 
Secondly, new provisions have been inse1ted to deal with the calling of 
shareholders' general meetings and meeting rules have been improved.26 
10 
Law Committee of the NPC, 'Report on Opinions on the Amendments to the Securities Law Bill ' in 
the Securities Law Drafting Group, Annotation of the PRC Securities Law, Beijing, Reform Press, 
1999, p 445 ' l l . 
, Above note 5. 
~ PRC Company Law 1993, article 1. 
: 4 i'uticles 34, 98. ~ Article 97. 
, Article 117 . 
• & Articles 40, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106. 
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Finally, the provisions on the shareholder representative action provide the 
remedy for the minority shareholders. The shareholder representative action -"!-lUill'JII~ 
defined in article 152 of the 2005 Company Law will be discussed in detail later.. 
Following the amendments made in the 2005 Company Law, vu1respor1allllE! 
were made in the 2005 Securities Law: 
(i) some misconduct in the securities market such as insider trading, n.<>.~ ...... "-~·· 
market manipulation will bear civil compensation liability as well as 
liability/7 
(ii) when a takeover bidder company or its controlling shareholder nas; 
the interests of the target company-or the interests of other 
caused loss to them, the bidder company and its controlling -----~-'"''~-'-y,''w 
bear liability to pay compensation;28 
(iii) in particular, shareholder representative actions can be brought by "<~U" "'"""'u 1u, 
when directors, supervisors, senior managerial staff or shareholdeF 
more than 5% or more of the company shares have breached the r,.,,,.n., 
trading in company shares during a six-month period and the company; 
take actions.29 This is a special type of shareholder representative aGtlo 
Obviously the shareholder representative action has been introduced into 
law as an important mechanism aimed at the protection of minority shareholdtirs 
this article will deal with the issues with respect to the shareholder representativ J1t1a1\l8i,~l!ll 
3.2 Concepts of Shareholder Representative Action, Derivative ,..,H,.,n, 
Shareholder Direct Action in China 
Just as China's economy is at a transitional stage,31 China's enterprise ~.,;;,;;t.,:,.;, 
securities market are also going through transitional changes.32 China has oell:mnra 
upon foreign experience in developing its own companies and securitie 
regimes since the early 1990s.33 However, much knowledge about foreigJU 
practice came from study of provisions of foreign laws and short visits to s'O ~ 
countries by China's law drafting people/4 and :from the ten-member COJtflW~"llfP. 
Amendment Expert Advisory Group of whom few had a thorough Uli~l~~:@l!~ 
foreign company laws when the first Company Law and Securities Law 
revised. Thus accuracy and completeness of this knowledge was somewn,a1! 
This situation resulted in the confusing provisions in the new Cornpan~ 
Securities Law. The concepts of shareholder representative action, 
direct action are examples of such confusion. 
27 Articles 69, 76, 77, 79. 
28 Article 124. 
29 Article 47. 
3° Cao, KT, 'Explanations on the Company Law Bill' in JAn (ed) An Annotation of 
Company L(I}V, p 355. 
31 Zhang, YJ, LJ Xiao, WH Long and JS Tang, Reform and Development of Chinese Stoc"M 
Transitional Period, Chengdu, Southwest University of Finance and Economics Press, '2 00~, P 
32 Ibid. 
33 The making of the 1993 Company Law, 1998 Securities Law, the 2005 Company Law, and 
Securities Law is strong evidence. 
34 An, J (ed), p 350. 
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.AJ.ticle 152 of the 2005 Company Law is the key provision on shareholder 
representative action. It provides that 'when any director, or any senior managerial 
officer has breached laws, regulations or the articles of association of the company, and 
thereby caused damage to the company, a shareholder, or a group of shareholders 
holding 1% or more of the company shares (either separately or jointly) for a 
consecutive period of 180 days, may in writing request that the supervisory board or the 
supervisor (in the case of a limited liability company), bring an action against this 
director, supervisor or senior managerial officer to the court; if any supervisor is 
involved in such a breach, the aforesaid shareholder(s) may in writing request the board 
of directors or the executive director (in the case of a limited liability company which 
has not established a board of directors) to bring such an action before the comt.' 
.AJ.ticle 152 continues to provide that shareholders shall bring a shareholder 
representative action on their own behalf for the interests of the company. Western 
lawyers may find it hard to understand how an action brought by shareholders on their 
own behalf can be called a derivative action. This is because the derivative action in 
Westem countries refers to an action brought by shareholders on behalf ofthe company 
for a v.JTong done to the company where the company is unwilling or unable to bring the 
action. 35 Thus an action under article 152 would be seen as a direct action in Western 
countries. 
In China it was widely believed by Chinese legal scholars that the shareholder 
representative action was the same as the derivative action. 36 Professor Liu Junhai, one 
of the prominent company law scholars, held the view that 'the shareholder derivative 
action refened to an action which was brought by shareholders on their own behalf 
when the interests of the company had been infringed by other parties, especially by the 
controlling shareholder or directors. '37 He argued that although the derivative action 
was focused on shareholders exercising the company's rights, the representative action 
was focused on the shareholders' status as the representative of the company in the 
action, and both actions really meant the same thing. 38 Professor Yan Qing noted that 
the term "delivative action was used in common law countries, whilst in civil law 
cow1hies this action was called representative action'. 39 In a book edited by Professor 
Jiang Ping, one of the ten experts of the Company Law Amendment Experts Advisory 
Group, it '~'as also held that "the derivative action is also called the shareholder 
representative action". 40 Even the State Council drafters of the original Company Law 
bill held the same view.41 
To some degree there was therefore an incomplete understanding in China of 
derivative actions. Most of the literature mentioned above describes the shareholder 
ll 
Australian C01porations Act 2001 (Cth), section 236; Australian C01porate Law Economic Reform 
~rog~.'am. Billl998 E;.planation Memorandum, para 4.2 
Sht, T1autao, Co1porations Law, Law Press, 2005, p 508; Yan, Qing, 'Corporations Law Regulation 
on Related Transactions in Listed Companies' in Guo F and J Wang (eds) On Amendments to the ~on~pany Law, Law Press, 2000, pp 266 -322 at 304. 
L Lm Junhai, 'On Shareholders' Right to Bring a Representative Action' in Wang BS (ed) Commercial 
,\~.~ssays, Volume 1, Beijing, Law Press, 1997, p 84. , 
., lu,p85. 
" y 
W an, Q, 'Corporations Law Regulation on Related Transactions in Listed Companies' in Guo, F and J 
•1 ~~g (eds~ On Amendments to the Company Law, Beijing, Law Press, 2000, pp 266 -322 at 304. 
Co~ant, Pmg and Guoguang Li (eds), The New Company Law Training Textbook, Beijing, People's 
•t 11 ress, 2005, p 327. 
Ch~n:\ Kangtai et al (eds) A Research Report on Amendments to the New Company Law, Beijing, 
ega! System Press, 2005, p 159. 
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representative action as one action brought on behalf of shareholders.42 Few 
advocated that the derivative action must be brought on behalf of the comp 
seemed that the draftsmen of the LAC were reluctant to use the term de1i 
which came from the US law. Instead, they chose the terms of 
representative action which is used in the Japanese law and the Taiwanes~ 
However, the LAC did not elaborate whether the shareholder representative actio 
different from the derivative action. Some legal academics continue to hold tlle t~tP."•<n-·:~1..,_ 1 
that the derivative action is "the same as the shareholder representative action".4s 
What is clear among most of the scholars who think that the derivative actioDJ i~ 
same as the shareholder representative action is that both terms refer to an act1~r;~l!!~ed!t\?:!.J 
on the right to sue which belongs to the company; what is confusing is that 
that shareholders should sue on behalf of themselves, rather than on belialif of 
company.46 This is confusion between the direct action and the derivative action. 
There were three major reasons for the Chinese legislators' preferred us o:lhlJ'e 
shareholder representative action. First, if the Company Law allowed shar~lioltl iis 
bring an action on behalf of the company when the interests of the company nave 
infringed, and the company is unable or fails to bring such an action against 
wrongdoer, there would be a conflict with the current PRC legal representative 
system.47 China introduced a system of director in charge from the former USSRl · fh~ 
PRC General Principles of Civil Law 1986. Under this Law and the Law O:Q ~\:!"~!:!W.~ 
Enterprises Owned by the Whole People 1988, the director of a factory was tli'P•q;om· 
representative of that factory. 48 The legal representative refers to 
represents the· company when dealing with outsiders. This concept is 
as 'the person who signs on behalf of the enterprise'. 49 
Secondly, the functions of a legal representative also include 
compa!lY to appear in courts. Under the 1993 Company Law, the Chairman oftli6 
of directors was the legal representative. 50 During the process of draftin!?i me 
Company Law, the Supreme People's Court argued that if shareholders 
bring an action on their own behalf when the interests of the company 
these shareholders would be representing the company in comts and thus woul<i 
a legal representative of the company. Therefore, this would be in conflict witlli 
representative provisions found in the previous legislation. 51 
Thirdly, if shareholders were allowed to bring an action on behalf of 
were they the plaintiffs or the agents of the plaintiff? To avoid the ambigvities 
42 Du, WH, 'Opinions on Interpretation of the Company Law' in Guo, F and J Wang 
Zhang; XB, 'Ten Suggestions for the Amendments to the Company Law' in Guo, F and I 
509. 
43 Shi , Tiantao, p 304; Cao, Kangtai et al (eds), A Research Report on AmendmenJs. to 
Company Law, p 159. 
44 An, Jian (ed), An Annotation of the 2005 PR_C Nev; Company Law, p 218. . .. . 
45 Jiang, Ping and Guoguang Li (eds), 171e New Company Law Training Textbook, BeiJ!llgj 
Comt Press, 2005, p 327. . . ,, · GUO 
46 Xu, HF, "The Company Law Should Improve the Protection of Mmonty Shareholders 
and J Wang (eds) On Amendments to the Company Law, pp 134 - 146 at 138 
47 Author's interview of Professor Wang Baoshu of Tsinghua University Law School, a roem er. 
Company Law Amendment Expe1ts Advisory Group on 4 December 2005 in Beijing. 
48 Ibid. 
49 The State Administration for Industry and Connnerce, Amendments to the . 
Concerning Registration and Administration of Enterprise Legal Persons 1996, arucle 
50 Ibid, articles 45, 113 . _ __ ....... 
51 Author's interview of Professor Wang Baoshu, above note 47. 
legal status of such shareholders before courts, the Supreme Peoples' Court objected to 
alloviring shareholders to bring an action on behalf of the company against the 
wrongdoer. Tins argument was reflected in the language of article 152.52 Article 13 of 
the Company Law 2005 expands the ' legal representative of the company' to include 
the chairman, the executive director or the manager. Nowadays, a new persuasive view 
is to treat the company as a third party without separate right to sue. 
In China, the concept of the derivative action has been widely used by acadenlics. 
As they have aclmowledged that although this concept originated in the Anglo-
American legal system,53 the concept in the Chinese law was unfortunately based on 
half-understanding and confusion. The views of the influential Chinese academics 
would later have to some degree misled the legislators. 
The first confusion is between the shareholder representative action and the direct 
action. Under article 153 of China's 2005 Company Law, if the misconduct of directors 
or senior managerial personnel of the company has infringed the interests of a 
shareholder, the shareholder may bring an action against them to the court. The action 
brought in this way is direct action.54 The legislative drafters explained that the direct 
action was an action brought by shareholders on their own behalf when their personal 
interests were infringed.55 Article 153 article originated from article 111 of the 1993 
Company Law. There are four major differences between the shareholder representative 
action and the direct action: (i) the shareholder's right to bring a representative action 
comes from the right belonging to the company while in a direct action the 
shareholder's right to sue belongs to himself/herself; (ii) in the shareholder 
representative action, the wrongdoer is the defendant, including not only directors or 
supervisors, but also a third party; in the direct action, directors, supervisors or senior 
managerial personnel are the defendants; (iii) the shareholder representative action deals 
with the infringement of the interest of the company while the direct action deals with 
the infringement of a shareholder's personal interest; (iv) the proceeds of the 
shareholder representative action belong to the company and the interests of all other 
shareholders are indirectly protected, while the proceeds of the direct action belong to 
the individual shareholders who have sued in the direct action. 
The concept of the shareholder representative action is very confusing for another 
reason. Such representatives can be easily mixed up with the representatives in joint 
actions which are regulated under article 53 ofthe PRC Civil Procedure Law. Article 53 
provides that if the subject matters in two or more actions are the same or of the same 
kind, these actions are joint actions; and the People's Court may merge these cases with 
tl1e agreement of all parties. It also provides that if there are too many litigants, 
shareholders may elect representatives in the litigation. However, in the class action, the 
subject matters of plaintiffs may not be the same. So far no further laws have been made 
or amended to accommodate the utilisation of the shareholder representative action . 
. China has not accepted the class action into its legal system. The joint action is 
"?dely used when there are more than one plaintiffs or defendants. In fact, it is slightly 
?Jfferent from the class action which exists in many Western countries. The applicants 
111 t:le joint action have the same dispute and the same judgment binds eve1y applicant; 
While in the class action, the judgment applies to , the same kind of litigants no matter 
whether they agree with the judgment or not. 
,,------------
--Ibid. 
lly 
A. .an Q, P 304; Shi, TT, p 509; QM, Sheng 'The Category and the Parties of Shareholder Derivative 
~ c;.~ns' (2006) 1 Chinese Commercial Law Review 125-131 at 125. 
ss ·lb~ · 1 (ed), p 219. 
!d. 
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3.3 Comparison of the Shareholder Rep7'esentative Action under the 1'9"93. 
Company Law and the 2005 Company Law 
To assess the functions of the shareholder representative action precis(]:l~ 
objectively, it is vitally important to review the law making process. Tlie 
Company Law was silent on whether shareholders could bring representative 9:~>1.\tl!ln~~ 
only article 63 provided that 'directors, supervisors and managers should bear wn>rUt.fi/J?Al 
to pay compensation if they had breached laws, administrative regulations, 0 
mticles of association of the company, and thus had caused damage to the CQI]l!ll1i.1iiv~.,;-i~ 
This article could be interpreted as the basis for bringing shareholder re:~=1resieJn~l!i~t~~~q 
actions. However, the 1993 Company Law did not use the term of VU'"l;l;.\W;!lJJ~ I~I·;t:!i] 
representative action nor did it have any related provisions for actions under 
Consequently, old article 63 was merely a symbolic gesture without any real A ... .,' """'-·::.• 
effect. 
In China the shareholder representative action was seen as a mechanism ford ', G&t~ 
protecting the interests of the company and indirectly protecting the interests cfj t)ie 
minority shareholders.56 The 2005 Company Law has formally adopted the coneGp; o'fl 
the shareholder representative action. Although Chinese lawmakers have tried to 11IiN0 
the derivative action mechm1ism that is used in Western company laws, the shareli0 1(;16 
representative action nevettheless has been tailored to suit the needs of Chin 
environment. Unfortunately the Chinese law has mixed up the shar 
representative action with the direct action because Chinese law-makers are relu~tafi 
accept the class action. 
To get a- clearer picture of the shm·eholder representative action mechanism, i~ [ 
necessary to visit the relevant provisions in the 2005 Company Law in detail. ·=·m•m"'" 
152 allows certain shareholders to bring a shareholder representative action 'on 
of themselves'. Article 153 goes on to provide for shareholders' direct actions. Tt~1'!itP.~~··~ 
that 'when directors or senior managerial persmmel have breached laws, adiniQ;il~itm:i:: 
regulations or the articles of association of the company, and have 
interests of shareholders, shareholders may bring an action to the court.' It is 
to allow both the shareholder representative action and the shareholder direct a0ti0 
be brought on the shareholders' own behalf. 
3.4 The Shareholder Representative Action under the 2005 Securities Ilaw 
Most of the situations in which shareholders may bring representative actio 
covered by article 152 of the 2005 Company Law. In addition, there are sfiU !iltli" 
situations where shareholder representative actions can be brought, sucn as ' o re 
provided under article 47 of the 2005 Securities Law. Article 47 aims to pre. ~n~ · 
insiders of listed companies from making personal gains. It provides fo r a special · e 
of shareholder representative actions. It is worth noting that the action under arti0~ 'Ill 
must also be brought on behalf of the shareholders, rather than on behalf/ o:6 t]il} 
company, although su~h a right to sue belongs to the company. 
56 Ibid. 
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3.5 The Parties and the Requirem.ents for Bringing a Shareholder 
Representative Action 
Chinese law-makers have tried to balance the right to bring shareholder representative 
actions and the business efficiency ofthe company. 57 On the one hand shareholders are 
given the right to bring representative actions for the purpose of protecting minority 
shareholders. On the other hand, some restrictions are imposed so that there are no 
frivolous actions and company's resources will not be wasted. Article 152 of the 2005 
Company Law provides that a shareholder representative action can only be brought to 
the court on the following conditions: 
• Only certain shareholders can sue and only certain officers can be sued 
Under paragraph 1 of article 152, only cmrent shareholders may bring a 
representative action. Former and future shareholders do not have the right to 
sue on behalf of the company. As the Chinese Company Law only allows 
limited liability companies and shareholding limited liability companies to be 
formed,58 the persons intending to sue must be cmrent shareholders of the 
company. In Australia, the range of plaintiffs is very broad: not only a current 
shareholder, but also a fom1er shareholder, or even an officer of the company 
can bring a statutory derivative action. 59 
• Article 152 only allows a director, a senior manager, or a supervisor to be 
sued. 
It excludes the important officer - the secretary of the board of directors. But it 
does not specify who is a 'senior manager'. Although it allows 'another 
person' who infringed the interests of the company to be sued, the concept of 
'another person' is too board for Chinese judges who have no power to 
interpret substantive law. 
• Requirements for the minimum shareholding and the minimum duration of 
shareholding 
Alticle 152 further requires that the shareholder(s) in a joint stock company 
which can issue securities to the general public must either separately or jointly 
hold 1% or more of the company shares and this shareholding must last for 180 
consecutive days before the action can be brought. In a big SOE which issued 
millions of shares, it is not easy to hold 1% of the total shares. 180 consecutive 
days of shareholding is also too restrictive as most individual shareholders 
prefer short-tenn trading in the Chinese securities markets. In Western 
countries such as Australia there is no requirement for shareholding percentage 
or shareholding duration. · 
As mentioned earlier, during the drafting of the 2005 Amendments, there had 
been different opinions on whether the system of a sole representative of the 
legal person should be reformed as this system was in conflict with the 
shareholder de1ivative action and was not in use in other countries. 60 After 
examining the counterpart laws ofthe US, Japan, Korea, Germany and Taiwan, 
' J 
:1 An, I (ed), p 218. ~Q Article 2. 
- Austr 1· c 
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and considering that China had no sound credit and trust system, the ll1a.Jwnitiv~~ 
of the legislators formed the view that it was necessary to maintain the 
quo. Nevertheless, the 2005 amendments have expanded the scope o:E 
people who can act as the legal representative ofthe company.61 
The national legislature so far has not made any accommodating ----,..,~.•·•u" 
or interpretations about the detailed procedure for bringing the 
representative action. It is hard for Chinese judges to effectively an(ii 
implement article 152 for the same reason as that mentioned above. 
• Pre-requisites for bringing a shareholders representative action 
There are three pre-requisites: (i) the shareholder must have refemr 
subject matter to the directors or supervisors of the company, or the 
director of a company without a board~ or the supervisor of a compaD.] 
the supervisory board, before he/she can bring an action to the court; 
request for dealing with the subject matter must be made in writing; 
action may only be brought after the board of directors, the lnPn,·co",;"Mill'l'l'; 
the executive director of a company without a board of directors, , 
supervisor of a company without a supervismy board has refused to ~g., 
action, or has failed to bring an action~ or if there is an emergence an~ ~· .,.~~~ ·· .. n 
immediate court proceedings will make the company suffer unrec 
These prerequisites were designed for China's domestic situation . !13u 
practice they are extremely hard to meet. First, it is very tr" me-c~[lj5)lfi;rit1it 
complicated, and even costly for minority shareholders to request the r.-:r.mlii;'l;.~~.•· 
to first deal with the matter because individual shareholders live · 
citi5!s and companies are not very responsive to outsiders. SecondlJ?, iti ~· .. ~~ ............. " .... 
very hard to prove the urgency of the subject matter. Thirdly~ it is rn· n]:ru~ti~tii~;J 
to request directors to first deal with supervisors' misconduct as ctm~~' 
supervisors do not have equal status in China. Supervisors can mv~~Ynif.i.lreti 
directors and senior managers or even bring legal actions against 
practice; supervisors are senior to directors. It is not easy for tlie 
directors to sue supervisors as the latter are usually appointed 
government. It is not efficient and effective in China to use the -~~~.t"~~w· 
as a filter to prevent frivolous actions. 
3. 6 Costs Issues 
A common problem in both China and Australia is the ambiguity about the eost 
Legal costs can operate as a disincentive to litigation and thus Australian co ; s W~~~ 
given the power to make costs orders in derivative actions. 63 This power to 1!!9.1' 1\!~!~",'!l::~t 
orders is very broad and discretionary. 
Sometimes the costs problem under the Chinese law is simpler to soLV.e 
Australia because the Supreme People's Court (SPC) has set the rules on timl~l~f(~~1:~1 
However, there is still some llJ,1certainty. The 2005 Company Law does no 
detailed procedures for bringing the shareholder representative action, ld a· o · e 
6 r Fu, J andY Jie, PRC Company & Securities Laws - A Practical Guide, Singapore: CC:Hl Asja, 
f 40. 
2 PRC Company Law 2005, atticles 54(3), 55 and 119. 
63 Ramsay, 'Corporate Govemance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospects for a Statuto 
163. ----
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provisions on the indemnity of the costs of the shareholder who brought such action. If 
a shareholder representative action is brought to a Chinese court and accepted, most 
probably the court will apply the general rules on litigation costs released by the 
Supreme Peoples' Court. One such rule is that the loser pays the cost of the winner. In a 
shareholder representative action, the shareholder plaintiff will be treated the same as 
any other plaintiff in any other civil cases. If he wins, his legal costs will be first fully 
indemnified out of the remedies awarded to the company. If the monetary remedies are 
big enough to cover the shareholder's litigation costs and the loss of the company, it is 
going to be fine. But if the monetary remedies are not enough to cover the loss of the 
company, or not enough to pay the shareholder's litigation costs, which of the litigating 
shareholder and the company will be paid first remains a question. This uncertainty to 
some degree is one of the disincentives for using of the shareholder representative 
action. If the remedies are not monetary at all, it will certainly deter the use of the 
shareholder representative action. 
4. Conclusion 
The mechanism of the shareholder derivative action was only introduced into China 
very recently. 64 It is a great leap forward in the Chinese company law and corporate 
govemance reform. 
Yet, the shareholder representative action in China is an ambiguous and confusing 
mechanism which is based on a half-understanding of the derivative action scheme of 
Westem countries. This mechanism is also incomplete and symbolic. It will only 
assuage the law-makers' good intention but be of limited effectiveness in providing the 
protection of the minority shareholders in China. 
To improve this mechanism much work has to be done: China first has to be clear 
to what extent it can transplant the common law seeds into China's civil law soil; the 
confusion of the nature of the derivative action with that ofthe shareholder direct action 
must be cleared; detailed litigation procedures (especially jurisdiction and status of each 
litigation participant) must be set urgently; the indenmity of litigation costs must be 
clearly provided. 
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